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Brodie: Products Liability

BROWN V. SUPERIOR COURT: DRUG
MANUFACTURERS GET IMMUNIZED FROM
STRICT LIABILITY FOR DESIGN DEFECTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Brown v. Superior Courtl the California Supreme Court
held that a drug manufacturer cannot be held strictly liable for
harm caused by a prescription drug. In doing so, the court purported to adopt comment k of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
SECTION 402A2 (hereinafter comment k), but interpreted the

•••

1. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea·
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer or to his property, if (a) the seller is
engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is
expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub·
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The
rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the
product from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller .

comment k
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products
which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite in·
capable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary
use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An
outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment
of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and
damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease
itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing
and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding
the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a
product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and
the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be
sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental
drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for
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comment as providing a blanket immunity from strict liability
for design defects of prescription drugs.
The court's decision gives prescription drug manufacturers
broad protection against liability. A consumer injured due to the
defective condition of a prescription drug must now prove negligence or failure to warn of a known risk.
The Brown decision resulted from a suit filed by 69 women
against numerous drug manufacturers who allegedly produced
DES,S a substance ingested by the plaintiffs' mothers to prevent
miscarriage. They alleged that DES was defective and caused
them injury in utero:' The court's ruling will impact both men
and women as consumers of prescription drugs. However, the
decision has several ramifications which will impact specifically
on womens' health. First, it appears that women have suffered
the greatest ill-effects from their mothers' ingestion of DES.II
sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of
safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug
notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of
such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given,
where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely
because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known
but apparently reasonable risk.
3. Diethylstilbestrol (DES) is a synthetic substance which duplicates the activity of
estrogen, a female sex hormone. In 1947, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authorized the marketing of DES as a miscarriage preventative on an experimental basis.
DES was made or distributed by 267 drug companies. The drug companies were all able
to produce the drug because it was an unpatented generic product. By the mid-1950's
studies had been conducted showing that DES did not prevent miscarriages. However,
the drug remained on the market. In 1971, several physicians published an article associating DES with a rare form of vaginal cancer in young girls born to women who had
taken the drug during pregnancy. The cancer, clear-cell adenocarcinoma, had previously
been seen only in much older women. R. MEYERS, DES, THE BJ'ITER PILL 17-19 (1983). In
1971, the FDA ordered that DES not be marketed or promoted for the purpose of
preventing miscarriages. Sindell v. Abott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163
C)l. Rptr. 132 (1980).
For a detailed history and information on DES, see D. FINK, DES TASK FORCE SUMMARY REPORT, (DHEW, PUB. No. (NIH) 84-1688 1978).
4. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1054-1055, 751 P.2d 470, 473, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 412, 414 (1988).
5. Some research has indicated that there is a slightly higher frequency of certain
genital abnormalities among DES sons. Some examples include undescended testes, hypoplastic testes, epididymal cysts, and low or abnormal sperm counts. D. FINK, DES
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Second, some prescription drugs such as birth control pills and
pregnancy medications are designed and marketed specifically
for women. In light of the Brown decision, women using these
types of prescription drugs will be prohibited from bringing a
strict liability action if a drug is defectively designed. Finally, if
this decision reflects a trend by a new and more conservative
California Supreme Court,6 it may have an even greater impact
on women. In Collins v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation 7 the
California Court of Appeals for the Fifth District held that an
IUD (a prescription device) was exempt from strict liability design defect analysis. The Collins court stated, "[w]hen the product which allegedly caused a plaintiff's injury is a prescription
product, which is distributed with the approval of the FDA provided the manufacturer accompany the product with warnings
of foreseeable risks, we conclude the product must be considered
unavoidably unsafe as a matter of law and thus outside the parameters of strict liability for defective design."8 The California
Supreme Court initially granted Collins review prior to its decision in Brown. S Subsequent to Brown, however, the California
Supreme Court dismissed and remanded Collins back to the
court of appeals. 10 If other appellate courts follow the Collins
TASK FORCE SUMMARY REPORT, (DHEW, PUB. No. (NIH) 53844403 23 (1985)). There is
no evidence yet of any increased risk of cancer of the testes, prostate or other sites
among DES sons. D. FINK, DES TASK FORCE SUMMARY REPORT, (DHEW, PUB. No. (NIH)
84-1688 65 (1978)).
6. For the first time in California's history, voters decided in November 1986 not to
retain sitting justices-Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird, Associate Justice Cruz Reynoso, and Associate Justice Joseph Grodin. Much of the campaign against them was
fought on the death penalty issue, but the court's tort decisions were also attacked.
Sugarman, Taking Advantage of the Torts Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 338 (1987).
7. Review granted, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1194, 732 P.2d 542, 234 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1987),
dismissed 761 P.2d 102, 251 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1988). Plaintiff suffered uterine problems
that ultimately resulted in a hysterectomy. The problems were allegedly caused by an
intrauterine (IUD) birth control device.
8. Collins v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1539, 1551, 231 Cal.
Rptr. 396, 404 (1986).
9. Collins was granted review Feb. 26, 1987. Collins v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
186 Cal. App. 3d 1194, 732 P.2d 542, 234 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1987). Brown was decided April
1, 1988.
10. Collins, 761 P.2d 102, 251 Cal. Rptr. 642. The court dismissed the review pursuant to Rule 29.4(c) of California Rules of Court. Rule 29.4(c) states in part:
"[Dismissal of review) The Supreme Court may dismiss review
of a cause as improvidently granted and remand the cause to
the Court of Appeal."
If the Supreme Court dismisses review as improvidently granted under subdivision (c),
the cause is restored to the posture it had before the Supreme Court granted review: the
decision of the Court of Appeal is final. CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT 29.4(c) Advisory
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rationale, women injured due to defectively designed prescription devices (e.g. prescription contraceptive devices) will be precluded from proceeding on a strict liability design defect theory.

II.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs in Brown sought recovery on theories of strict
liability for design defect, failure to warn, breach of express and
implied warranty, fraud and negligence,u The California Supreme Court granted review to examine the conclusions of the
court of appeals and its potential conflict with Kearl v. Lederle
Laboratories 12 on the issue of strict liability of a drug manufacturer for a defect in the design of a prescription drug. 13
The Kearl court disapproved the "rather routine and
mechanical fashion by which many appellate courts have concluded that certain products, particularly drugs," are exempted
from strict products liability.14 That court held that the decision
as to whether a drug, vaccine, or any other product is entitled to
exemption from strict liability design defect analysis as an unavoidably unsafe product is a mixed question of law and fact. A
trial court should take evidence as to: (1) whether, when distributed, the product was intended to confer an exceptionally important benefit that made its availability highly desirable; (2)
whether the then-existing risk posed by the product both was
"substantial" and "unavoidable";ll1 and (3) whether the interest
in availability (measured as of the time of distribution) outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced accountability
through strict liability design defect review. If these factors exCommittee's comment.
11. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1055-1056, 751 P.2d 470, 473, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 412, 414-415 (1988).
12. 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985).
13. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1055-1056, 751 P.2d at 473, 245 Cal. Rptr. 415.
14. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463
(1985).
15. One commentator has suggested that courts should weigh the risks which exist
at the time of trial. Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the
Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 570-571 (1969). The
rationale is that the fact-finding task in determining whether a risk is knowable is often
impossible, especially when drugs are involved. The outcome "depends too much on the
competency and skill of the advocates and investigators." [d. at 570. However, this is too
great a burden to place on manufacturers as they should not be required to be clairvoyant. Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 337-338, 732 P.2d 297, 306-307 (1987).
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ist, the product will be deemed unavoidably dangerous and exempted from strict products liability design defect analysis. IS
The Brown court rejected that portion of Kearl 17 which held
that not all prescription drugs should be exempt from strict liability design defect analysis. IS This note analyzes only that portion of the Brown decision relating to design defects l9 in prescription drugs. 2o

III. THE COURT'S REASONING

A.

PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AS COMPARED TO OTHER PRODUCTS

The Brown court attempted to distinguish prescription
drugs from other products.
In the latter cases [other products], the product is
used to make work easier or to provide pleasure,
while in the former [prescription drugs] it may be
necessary to alleviate pain and suffering or to sustain life. Moreover, unlike other important medical products (wheelchairs, for example), harm
to some users from prescription drugs IS
unavoidable. 21

Once the court determined there was a distinction between prescription drugs and other products, it then balanced the public
policies mitigating for and against imposition of strict liability
for design defects of prescription drugs.
16. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 829-830, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463-464.
17. 172 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463 (1984).
18. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1068-1069,751 P.2d 470, 482, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 412, 424 (1988).
19. Two alternative tests have been adopted by the California Supreme Court by
which to measure design defects. First, whether the product performed as safely as the
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended and reasonably foreseeable
manner. Second, whether the benefits of the challenged design outweighed the risk of
danger inherent in the design. This second test is know as the risk/benefit analysis.
Barker v. Lull Engineering, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-432, 573 P.2d 443, 455-456, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 237-238 (1978).
20. The Brown Court also dealt with the issues of failure to warn, fraud, breach of
express and implied warranty, and whether the liability imposed on drug manufacturers
in DES cases should be joint and several. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1065-1066 and 1069-1075,
751 P.2d at 477-478 and 483-487, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421-422 and 424-428.
21. [d. at 1063, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
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COMPETING PUBLIC POLICIES

1. Public Policies Favoring Strict Liability for Design Defects

in Prescription Drugs
The California Supreme Court first held a manufacturer
strictly liable in tort in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc. 22 In that landmark decision, Justice Traynor stated the purpose of strict liability is to impose the cost of injuries on manufacturers who market the product rather than on "injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."23
In addition to the public policy of placing the responsibility
of a defective product on the manufacturer, the goals of risk reduction and risk distribution also underlay the imposition of
strict liability. Risk reduction operates on the premise that manufacturers will work to make their products safer if they are liable for defective products. 24 Risk distribution spreads the cost of
injury from those who are harmed by a defective product to consumers of the product who will pay a higher price to reflect the
increased cost of insurance to the manufacturer.211 The Brown
court accepted that "[t]hese reasons could justify application of
the doctrine to the manufacturers of prescription drugs."26 However, because the court determined that prescription drugs are
distinct from other products it proceeded to evaluate counter
policy considerations. 27

2. Public Policies Opposing Strict Liability for Design Defects
in Prescription Drugs
The Brown court espoused three public policies mitigating
22. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 58-59, 377 P.2d 897, 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 698 (1963). Plaintiff
was injured by the defective design of a power tool. The court held that a manufacturer
is strictly liable in tort when an article it places on the market, knowing the article is to
be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to some
human being.
23. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
24. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1062, 751 P.2d 470, 478, 245 Cal. Rptr.
412, 419-420 (1988).
25. Id. at 1062-1063, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 419-420.
26. Id. at 1063, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
27. Id. at 44 Cal. 3d at 1063-1065, 751 P.2d at 478-480, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420-421.
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against imposing strict liability for prescription drugs. 28 First,
the court was concerned that drug manufacturers might stop
producing valuable drugs because of lost profits resulting from
lawsuits or the inability to obtain adequate insurance. 29
Second, there is a consumer interest in getting new drugs on
the market as ~uickly as possible. Imposition of strict liability
might cause manufacturers to delay in putting new products on
the market. 30
Finally, the added expense of insuring against strict liability
and additional research programs might cause the cost of medication to increase in price so that it would no longer be affordable to consumers.31
These policy considerations prompted the court to adopt
comment k and to interpret it as providing drug manufacturers
blanket immunity from strict liability for design defects. 32
C.

COMMENT

K

OF RESTATEMENT (SECOND) SECTION 402A

Comment k creates an exception to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SECTION 402A for products which are "unavoidably unsafe" and should, therefore, not be subject to strict liability.33 For over two decades, courts have almost universally
concluded that some special products should not be subjected to
design defect analysis. 34 The Brown court conceded that the language of comment k is unclear as to whether it should be interpreted as granting prescription drugs blanket immunity from
strict liability.31i However, the court chose to interpret the comment as exempting all prescription drugs from design defect
analysis stating, "we are of the view that the comment was intended to and should apply to all prescription drugs. "36
28. Id. at 1063·1065, 751 P.2d at 478·480, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420·421.
29. Id. at 44 Cal. 3d at 1063·1065, 751 P.2d at 479·480, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420·421.
30. Id. at 44 Cal. 3d at 1063, 751 P.2d at 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1061, 751 P.2d at 477, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 418 (1988).
33. See supra, note 2.
34. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 825, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 460·
461 (1985).
35. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1069, n.ll, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
36.Id.
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The court gave two reasons for this interpretation and application of comment k. First, it stated that "almost all jurisdictions that have adopted the rule stated in the comment view its
provisions as granting immunity from strict liability to all such
drugs."37 Second, the court contended that granting drug manufacturers any protection short of blanket immunity from strict
liability would result in valuable drugs being withheld from consumers. The court believed that the public interest in developing
and marketing new drugs would be substantially impaired by
the very process of attempting to distinguish which drugs should
receive the protection of comment k because drug manufacturers
would have no assurance as to whether a product placed on the
market will be measured by the liability standard of comment k
or a stricter standard. 3s "In order to vindicate the public's interest in the availability and affordability of prescription drugs, a
manufacturer must have a greater assurance that his products
will not be measured by a strict liability standard than is provided by the test stated in Kearl."39
The Brown court conceded that "[i]t seems unjust to grant
the same protection from liability to those who gave us
thalidomide as to the producers of penicillin. "40 However, the
court permitted other policies to override this injustice, and
therefore rejected the test set forth in Kearl which would determine if a prescription drug is entitled to comment k protection.
It is the opinion of this author that the Brown court erroneously allowed its concern for the availability and affordability of
prescription drugs to completely overshadow other important
public policy concerns favoring strict liability. This Note proposes that the availability and affordability of prescription drugs
could have been properly balanced with the need to protect innocent consumers by following the test set forth in Kearl u. Led-

erle Laboratories.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1067-1068, 751 P.2d at 481-482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423-424.
39. Id. at 1068, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424. The Brown court also gave
other reasons for its rejection of the Kearl test but those seemed secondary to the reasons discussed here. For a response to these other reasons, see Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho at 328, 340 n.10, 732 P.2d 297, 309 (1987).
40. Id. at 1067, 751 P.2d at 481, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
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CRITIQUE
EFFECTS OF BROWN DECISION

The California Supreme Court's decision will often result in
leaving a victim who is harmed by a defective drug without remedy. This unfortunate consequence will hold true regardless of
how catastrophic the harm or how ineffective or unnecessary the
drug. Although the victim can pursue a negligence cause of action, the hurdle is greater since the plaintiff must carry the evidentiary burden. 41 In the case of a drug manufacturer, a plaintiff
may have a particularly difficult burden of proof. "The time and
expense required to investigate all the procedures of those who
make and sell a new drug is enormous, and may prevent an individual litigant from gathering the necessary facts to prove negligence when it does, in fact, occur."42
B.

BROWNS DISTINCTION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

The distinctions made by the Brown court between prescription drugs and other products43 are artificial. The distinction between products which make work easier or provide pleasure and prescription drugs which may be necessary to alleviate
pain does not always hold true. For example, not all prescription
drugs are intended to alleviate pain and suffering but fall more
within the "providing pleasure" category. (e.g. minoxidol promotes hair growthH and Retin-A tightens wrinkles. 45 ) As technology develops and knowledge increases, it is reasonable to expect an increase in prescription drugs which are cosmetic and
would fit more within the "providing pleasure" classification.
Also, strict liability applies to other products (non-prescription
drugs) which alleviate pain and suffering. (e.g. arm and leg control devices enabling handicapped individuals to drive automobiles). The court's explanation for these differing standards was
41. The burden of proof of the defendant's negligence is on the plaintiff. W. PAGE
KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, P 139 (5th ed. 1984).
42. Keeton, Products Liability-Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 VAND. L. REV. 131, 141
(1972).
43. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1063, 751 P.2d at 478-479, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
44. Langone, Gone Today, Hair Tomorrow, TIME, Aug. 29, 1988, at 78.
45. Roberts, Questions Raised About Anti- Wrinkle Cream, SCIENCE, Feb. 5, 1988, at
564.
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prescription drugs

IS

The court's distinction based on the "unavoidability" of
harm is not relevant to the issue of liability for design defects in
prescription drugs. There is a difference between harm caused
by design defects as compared to harm caused by other adverse
drug reactions; Harm to some users of prescription drugs may
indeed be unavoidable if the harm resulted from idiosincratic reactions or side effects of the drug which could not be anticipated
by the manufacturer. 47 In contrast, if the harm is caused by a
design defect in the drug itself the harm was avoidable because a
safer alternative design was available. Therefore, by definition,
harm caused by a design defect cannot be "unavoidable."
The court's attempt to distinguish prescription drugs from
other products, either on the basis of the type of benefit they
confer or the avoidability of harm, is tenuous. The court's argument is circular: all prescription drugs should receive the protection which comment k grants to unavoidably unsafe products
because prescription drugs are unavoidably unsafe. The court's
reasoning makes it appear as if it first decided to exempt all prescription drugs from strict liability, and then selected comment
k as its vehicle to do so. Although the court has hung its hat on
comment k, the comment fails to provide the support for which
the Brown court searches to rest its policy based decision.
K

C.

THE COMMENT

CONTROVERSY

1.

The language of comment K

Commentators have criticized comment k as being vague,
46. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1063, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
47. A product which causes harm due to its interaction with a person's body chemistry does not exclude it from strict liability design defect analysis. The interaction of the
product with the body chemistry should be part of safety considerations inherent in the
design of the product. Thus, strict liability for design defect was applicable to a tampon
manufacturer. West v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 831, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 437 (1985). Plaintiff contracted toxic shock syndrome resulting from the use of a
vaginal tampon manufactured by defendant. She received a judgment against the manufacturer based on a strict product liability design defect theory. The West v. Johnson &
Johnson decision will presumably not be affected by Brown because it involved a nonprescription device.
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obscure or even meaningless. 48 The Brown court conceded it is
unclear whether comment k grants blanket immunity from strict
liability to all prescription drugs or just to those that are unavoidably dangerous. 49 Despite this uncertainty, the court
stated, "[n]evertheless, we are of the view that the comment was
intended and should apply to all prescription drugs ... [A]lmost
all jurisdictions that have adopted the rule stated in the comment view its provisions as granting immunity from strict liability to all such drugs."5o
The court's interpretation and application of comment k on
the basis of other states' holdings is without merit. "The Brown
court overlooked the mountain of decisions that limit comment
k to drugs that are in fact 'unavoidably unsafe'. . . and relied
instead on a handful of decisions that did not address the issue,
let alone resolve it in the manner Brown purported to follow."51
48. See, e.g., Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and For
Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 853 (1983); Twerski, National Product Liability
Legislation: In Search for the Best of All Possible Worlds, 18 IDAHO L. REV. 411, 430
(1982).
49. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1069 n.ll, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
50. Id. at 1069 n.ll, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
51. Brief for Appellants at 46, White v. Wyeth, 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 533 N.E. 2d 748
(1988)(No. 87-1657).
Appellants in White u. Wyeth analyzed the cases cited by the Brown court: In three
of the cases cited in Brown, the court held only that the evidence established the particular drug was unavoidably unsafe. See DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d
222, 229 (8th Cir. 1983) ("[t]he evidence in this case points to Talwin being an unavoidably unsafe product."); Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 447 So. 2d 1301,
1302 (Ala. 1984) (plaintiffs presented no facts that the drug was unavoidably unsafe);
Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326, 338-41 (Ariz. 1987) (reviewing evidence to
determine balance of risks and benefits).
In Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 425-426 (2nd Cir. 1969) (applying
Connecticut law), although the court relied on comment k, its discussion of the issue
suggests that it understood Connecticut not to generally recognize a cause of action for
strict liability design defect. Id. at n.12.
In Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F.Supp. 377, 380-381 (D. Md. 1975) aff'd, 567
F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977) (applying District of Columbia law), the court appeared to deal
with a failure to warn issue rather than a design defect claim. Brief for Appellants at 4647, n.39, White v. Wyeth, 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 533 N.E. 2d 748 (1988)(No. 87-1657).
In Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 447 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1984)
the court held only that the vaccine Orimune was an unavoidably unsafe product, not
that all prescription drugs and vaccines are unavoidably unsafe. Johnson, 239 Kan. at
285-286, 447 So. 2d at 1323-1324. Subsequently, in Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781-782 (1988), the Rhode Island Supreme Court cited Johnson to
stand for the proposition that the question of whether a prescription drug is unavoidably
unsafe is a ruling which the court allows the judge to make as a matter of law. Castrignano, 546 A.2d at 781-782. Obviously, this is contrary to the Brown court's use of
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Even assuming, arguendo, that those decisions of other states
gave all prescription drugs the protection of comment k, if the
Brown court were truly persuaded by the decisions of other jurisdictions ll2 it should have not simply followed their holdings
but, more important, it should have been persuaded by their
reasoning. Yet, as the Brown court itself noted, most cases which
have embraced the rule of comment k have not given much consideration to its language. 1I3 Thus, these cases offer little reasoning which might assist in the interpretation and application of
comment k. The Kearl court summarized this problem stating,
[a]1though ...the rule against subjecting some
special products to strict liability design defect
analysis is well established, its application has not
often been well explained. Instead, the rule is frequently stated in conclusory fashion accompanied
by little more than a reference or citation to Restatement Second of Torts section 402A, comment k, which sets out the basic rule.~·

"The statement that drugs are unavoidably unsafe, and therefore within the protection of comment k, has become almost tautological. "1111 The decisions of other jurisdictions, then, do little
to provide the Brown court a rationale for its interpretation and
application of comment k.
2. The interpretation and application of comment k by other
state supreme courts

Supreme court decisions in other states have challenged this
routine application of comment k to all prescription drugs. 1I6
Johnson as support for the proposition that comment k exempts all prescription drugs
from strict liability design defect analysis.
52. The Brown court's list of cases contains primarily district and appellate citations. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1059-1060, 751 P.2d at 476, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 417-418. It
includes only two state supreme court decisions, Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 447 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1984) and Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan.
279, 718 P.2d 1328 (Kan. 1986). Neither state supreme court decision holds that comment k protects all prescription drugs from design defect analysis. See supra note 51.
53. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1060, 751 P.2d 470, 476, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 418 (1988).
54. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 828, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463
(1985).
55. Note, Can A Prescription Drug Be Defectiuely Designed? Brochu u. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 247, 254 (1981).
56. Seven state supreme courts have explicitly determined that not all prescription
drugs should receive the protection of comment k:
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These courts have refused to give prescription drug manufacturers blanket immunity from strict liability design defects. 57 Instead, they have held that the question as to whether a drug is
unavoidably unsafe should be decided on a case-by-case basis. 58
In order for a prescription drug to receive the protection of comment k, the scale must clearly tip in favor of benefits. 59
The Idaho Supreme Court stated the rationale of a case-bycase analysis: a rule providing blanket immunity to prescription
drugs from strict liability design defect analysis without requiring a showing that comment k applies "runs counter both to the
express language of comment k and to common sense."60 That
court explained,
[w]e do not believe comment k was intended to
provide nor should it provide all ethical drugs
Colorado - Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986); Idaho Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297 (1987); New Jersey - Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429,479 A.2d 374 (1984); Ohio - White v. Wyeth, 40
Ohio St. 3d 390, 533 N.E. 2d 748 (1988); Oregon - Senn v. Wyeth, 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d
215 (1988); Rhode Island - Castrignano v. E.R Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775 (RI.
1988); Wisconsin - Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).
In addition, a Kansas state Supreme Court decision, Johnson v. American Cyanamid, 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318 (1986), has been interpreted as holding likewise. See
supra, note 51.
Two state supreme courts might be interpreted as exempting all prescription drugs
from strict liability design defect analysis, although neither specifically discussed the issue: Alabama - Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 447 So. 2d 1301, 1304 (Ala.
1984) ("[I]n the case of an 'unavoidably unsafe' yet properly prepared prescription drug,
[footnote omitted] the adequacy of the accompanying warning determines whether the
drug, as marketed, is defective, or unreasonably dangerous."); Nebraska - McDaniel v.
McNeil Laboratories, 196 Nel>. 190, 201, 241 N.W.2d 822, 828 (1976) ("An unavoidably
unsafe drug approved for marketing by the United States Food and Drug Administration
... as a matter of law, is not defective nor unreasonably dangerous ... ").
57. See supra note 56.
58. See Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 415-416 (Colo. 1986);
Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 340, 732 P.2d 297, 309 (1987); White v.
Wyeth, 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 395, 533 N.E. 2d 748, 752 (1989); Senn v. Merrell-Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 215, 218 n.4, (1988); Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 447, 479 A.2d 374, 383 (1984); Castrignano v. E.R Squibb & Sons,
Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781 (1988).
59. Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation, 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981).
Plaintiffs were a husband and wife who brought action against the manufacturer of oral
contraceptives to recover for damages the woman sustained from taking the drug. The
court held that the manufacturer could be held liable for a design defect in the drug.
60. Toner, 112 Idaho at 340, n.10, 732 P.2d at 309. Plaintiffs were parents of a child
who was permanently paralyzed from the waist down resulting from a vaccination. The
court analyzed comment k and determined that not all prescription drugs should receive
its protection.
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with blanket immunity from strict liability design
defects claims. The comment refers to 'some'
products which are unavoidably unsafe; ... Obviously, the comment does not apply to all drugs.
Rather the comment applies 'when the product is
unavoidably unsafe,' ... It is equally obvious that
not all drugs are so perfectly designed that they
cannot be made more pure or more safe, or that
there are not safer, suitable alternatives; nor do
the benefits of all drugs necessarily outweigh their
risks. 61

Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated, "we see no reason to hold as matter of law and policy that all prescription
drugs that are unsafe are unavoidably so. Drugs, like any other
products, may contain defects that could have been avoided by
better manufacturing or design. "62 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has refused to adopt comment k because it "is too restrictive and, therefore, not commensurate with strict products liability law in Wisconsin."63
Four months after Brown, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
considered the issue of whether all prescription drugs should receive the protection of comment k. Having the benefit of the
reasoning of each of the supreme court decisions discussed, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected Brown stating,
"[a]lthough both approaches have merit, we believe the societal
interest in ensuring the development and marketing of prescrip61. [d. at 339, 732 P.2d at 308.
62. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 447, 479 A.2d 374, 383 (1984).
Plaintiff suffered tooth discoloration caused by taking a tetracycline drug and brought a
strict liability action against the manufacturer for failing to warn the physician about the
drug's side effects. The court held that whether a prescription drug is unavoidably unsafe should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
63. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 197, 342 N.W.2d 37, 52 (1984). Plaintiff
claimed injuries from her mother's ingestion of DES while plaintiff was in utero. The
court permitted her to proceed under a strict products liability cause of action. To prevail on this theory, the plaintiff had to prove: (1) DES was defective when it left the
possession or control of the drug company; (2) that DES was unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer; (3) that the defect was a cause of the plaintiff's injury; (4) that the
drug company engaged in the business of producing or marketing DES; and (5) that the
product was one which the company expected to reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition it was when sold. Id., 116 Wis. 2d at 195-196, 342
N.W.2d at 51.
See also David, DTP: Drug Manufacturers' Liability, 9 J. PROD. LIAB. 361, 396-397
(1986) which adopts the view that comment k does not provide blanket immunity for all
prescription drugs.
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tion drugs will be adequately served by extending the protection
to prescription drugs on a case-by-case basis."64 Most recently
the Ohio Supreme Court held that whether a prescription drug
"qualifies as 'unavoidably unsafe' under Comment k is a determination to be made on a case-by-case basis."61i The Ohio Supreme Court explained, "[I]t is ... obvious that not all drugs are
so perfectly designed that they cannot be made more pure or
more safe, or that there are not safer, suitable alternatives; nor
do the benefits of all drugs necessarily outweigh their risks. "66
Thus, those state Supreme Courts faced with the issue of
whether prescription drugs should be afforded blanket immunity
from strict liability have opted for a case-by-case analysis.
3. The interpretation and application of comment K by California appellate courts

The Brown court also referred to three California appellate
court decisions which have applied comment k. 67 The court apparently cited these appellate decisions to bolster its interpretation and application of comment k. 68
First, the court referred to Carmichael v. Reitz. 6D However,
Carmichael does not support the court's interpretation of comment k. This is evidenced by Flood v. Wyeth 70 which was de64. Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781 (1988). Plaintiff
sought to recover for injuries incurred in utero by mother's ingestion of DES. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court certified three questions concerning injuries caused by prescription drugs: (1) Does the State of Rhode Island recognize an action for damages for personal injuries in the circumstances presented in that case based on theories of strict
liability in tort and breach of warranty of merchantability? (2) Does comment k to section 402A of the Restatement of Torts apply in Rhode Island to an action for damages
for personal injuries in the circumstances presented in that action based upon strict liability? (3) If comment k applies to that type of action, is its application to DES a matter
of law or a question of fact, and, if a question of fact, which party has the burden of
proof? [d. at 776-777.
65. White v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 395, 533 N.E.2d 748, 752
(1989).
66. [d. at 395, 533 N.E. 2d at 752 (citing Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho
328, 339, 732 P.2d 297, 308 (1987)).
67. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1059-1060, 751 P.2d 470, 476, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 412, 417-418 (1988).
68. [d. at 1059-1060, 751 P.2d at 476, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 417-418.
69. 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971).
70. Flood v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1272, 228 Cal. Rptr. 700
(1986).
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cided in the same district, fifteen years after Carmichael.7I The
Flood court recognized a strict liability cause of action for a vaccine and held the statutory scheme requiring immunization for
all school-aged children did not grant immunity to vaccine manufacturers. 72 The Flood court, in fact, looked to Kearl v. Lederle
Laboratories73 in reaching its decision and cited Kearl's holding
that "[m]anufacturers of vaccines are subject to liability under a
strict products liability design defect theory, unless the trial
court makes certain evidentiary findings. 1I74 The California Supreme Court denied the manufacturer's petition for review in
Flood. 7 " Flood, then, appears to stand for the proposition that
prescription drugs can be subject to design defect analysis.
The other two California appellate cases cited by the California Supreme Court as illustrative of courts which have
adopted comment k, Christofferson v. Kaiser76 and Toole v.
Richardson," dealt with the application of strict liability in the
context of a duty to warn. Neither stood for the proposition that
all prescription drugs should be protected by comment k. This is
apparent from the later Kearl decision 78 (14 years after Christofferson and 18 years after Toole) which was decided in the
same district as both of these cases. Because Kearl made no
mention of breaking with precedent, it is reasonable to conclude
that the Kearl court believed itself to be consistent with these
previous decisions.
The Brown court is correct in stating that these courts applied comment k.79 The comment, however, was not understood
as exempting all prescription drugs from a strict liability design
defect analysis. These cases do not bolster the Brown court's decision to protect all prescription drugs from strict liability design
defect analysis.
71. Carmichael, 17 Cal. Apr,>. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971).
72. Flood, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1275, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
73. [d. at 1276, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 702 (citing Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal.
App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985)).
74. [d.
75. [d. at 1280, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
76. Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 92 Cal. Rptr.
825 (1971).
77. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
78. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985).
79. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1059-1060,751 P.2d 470, 476, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 412, 417-418 (1988).
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In summary, the Brown court's interpretation of comment k
apparently was not gleaned from the ambiguous language of the
comment, the rationale of other jurisdictions or its prior application in California. Further, state supreme courts which have specifically considered the issue as to whether comment k should
exempt all prescription drugs from design defect analysis have
held contrary to Brown.

D.

THE KEARL TEST: BALANCING CONSUMER PROTECTION WITH

MANUFACTURER LIABILITY

1. A case-by-case "Kearl analysis" relieves the injured plaintiff of two evidentiary burdens

One of the purposes behind the strict product liability doctrine is to relieve an injured plaintiff of evidentiary burdens inherent in a negligence cause of action. 80 Application of a Kearl
analysis would effectuate this public policy..
First, once the plaintiff makes a prima facie case showing
that the drug's design was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury, the burden of proof shifts to the manufacturer81 who
would have the burden of showing that the drug is unavoidably
unsafe and, thus, should receive the protection of comment k. 82
Comment k, then, would be an affirmative defense to a claim
based on strict liability.83 As a matter of policy, the burden of
proving the status of the knowledge at the time of distribution
should be placed on the manufacturer since it is in a superior
position to know the technological information in the particular
field. 84 The drug manufacturer could use the criteria set forth in
Kearl to prove that the product is entitled to comment k protection. If the manufacturer is able to sustain its burden of proof
80. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-432, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978). Plaintiff was injured while operating a piece of heavy construction equipment and claimed that a safety device would have prevented the accident.
The court found that the defendant could be held liable for a defect in design. The court
held that the once the plaintiff proves that a product's design was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injury, the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that the utility of
the product outweighs the danger. [d.
81. [d.
82. Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho at 328, 338, 732 P.2d 297, 307 (1987).
83. [d. at 339, 732 P.2d at 308.
84. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 455-456, 479 A.2d 374, 388 (1984).
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that the drug is unavoidably unsafe, the plaintiff cannot proceed
on a strict liability cause of action. Second, if the manufacturer
cannot prove that its product should receive the protection of
comment k, the plaintiff can proceed on a strict liability cause of
action and the drug would be treated like other products to
which strict liability applies. Assuming the plaintiff has made
out a prima facie showing that the product's design was the
proximate cause of his/her injury, the burden of proof would
shift to the defendant to prove that the product is not
defective. 85
2. The Kearl test would not cause drug manufacturers to stop
the development of needed drugs

The Kearl test was unacceptable to the Brown court because drug manufacturers would not know whether a particular
drug would be judged as conferring an exceptional benefit to receive the protection of comment k. 86 The court felt that this potential exposure to greater liability would diminish a manufacturer's incentive to develop and distribute new drugs. 87 The
concern that tighter reigns of liability on drug manufacturers
would impede development of new drugs or cause bankruptcy
has been rejected by other courtS. 88 In 1960, a drug manufacturer unsuccessfully argued that public policy will best be served
by denying recovery in warranty for "new drugs" because development of medicines will be retarded if manufacturers are held
to strict liability for their defects. 89 Similarly, an Illinois court
rejected an argument by drug manufacturers that a market
share theory would render pharmaceutical companies uninsurable, and thus unable to absorb the costs of liability, stating,
"[t]hese economic considerations have arisen where courts have
contemplated any expansion of products liability law."90
85. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-432, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978).
86. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1067,751 P.2d 470, 481, 245 Cal. Rptr.
412, 423 (1988).
87. [d. at 1067-1068, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
88. See infra notes 89 and 90.
89. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 611-612, 6 Cal. Rptr.
320, 326 (1960). Plaintiff prevailed in an action based on a breach of implied warranty of
merchantability against the manufacturer of a Salk vaccine. Plaintiffs contracted poliomyelitis after being inoculated with the vaccine. [d. at 605, 612, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 322, 326.
90. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 527 N.E.2d 333, 349 (1988). Plaintiff was a DES daugh-
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"[D]rug manufacturers are· not nonprofit or charitable institutions. They are commercial profit-making enterprises ... "91
Drug manufacturers are in the business of developing and promoting new drugs and, as in any other enterprise, it pays to produce new products. 92 Drug manufacturers are in competition
with one another, just as any other industry. Therefore, they
must search for and develop new drugs to stay in business. 93
This concept is more than just academic rhetoric. Merck, a drug
manufacturer which has emerged as the leader in new drug development,94 was ranked number one as the most admired company in 1986, 1987 and 1988. 911 "I think Merck is a very competitive company, and I push our people to be competitive ... we
challenge people to get into new fields, and we tell them that the
objective is to make a drug, not just to discover facts and publish in trade journals. "96
Of course, a desire to remain competitive and produce new
ter who brought an action against manufacturers who produced DES.
91. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 444, 479 A.2d 374, 382 (1984). See
e.g., STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No.1 at H 16. "Earnings
. of many leading pharmaceutical companies have also benefited from extensive corporate
restructuring programs, which have involved the divestiture of unprofitable or marginal
non-drug businesses and stressed investment in high-profit drug operations." Id.
92. Selker, An Escape from Strict Liability: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Responsibility for Drug-related Injuries under Comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 23 DUQ. LAW REV. 199, 216 (1984). Drug manufacturers rely on
research and development as the key to future growth. STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY
SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No.1 at H 19. Drug patent laws should also encourage
continued development of new drugs. New prescription drugs generally receive a patent
for 17 years. After the patent expires, generic drugs may enter the market for that drug.
Generic drugs are copies of established brand-name drugs whose patent lives have expired. Prices for generic drugs are less than the original brand name drugs because there
is no need to recoup costs such as research and development, FDA approval and advertising. STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No.1 at H 22. Consequently, drug manufacturers must continue to come up with new drugs because they
cannot rely on continuing large profits from older drugs once the patents expire and
competitive prices enter the market.
93. Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18
RUTGERS L. REV. 947, 1017 (1964).
94. STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No.1 at H20.
95. Davenport, America's Most Admired Corporations, FORTUNE, Jan. 30, 1989, a~
68.
96. Schultz, America's Most Admired Corporations, Fortune, Jan. 18, 1988, at 38.
"Merck's ambitious research and development program spawm~d an unprecedented list
of new drug products, which are now beginning to be translated into sales and profits ...
By the end of this decade, the drugs mentioned above could generate over $1 billion in
new revenues for Merck." STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No.
1 at H20.
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drugs is not enough. It must also be financially feasible for drug
manufacturers to absorb increased insurance costs which may
result from potential litigation. Statistics indicate that drug
manufacturers have the necessary financial resources. B7 Sixteen
pharmaceutical companies are ranked in the top 500 companies
in the United States. BS The industry median for pharmaceutical
companies in 1986 for return to investors was 27.90%.99 Net income rose as high as $779 million. loo Overall profits increased
20.3% from the previous year. IOI It has been said that "[i]f ever
there were an industry which could easily withstand the impact
of liability ... it is the drug industry."lo2
Finally, the Brown court's belief that the development of
new drugs will be facilitated by holding drug manufacturers to a
97. American Cyanamid Co., a drug manufacturer, discussed the financial impact
of lawsuits on the company in its 1984 annual report.
The company and its subsidiaries are parties to numerous
suits and claims arising out of the conduct of the business.
Included among such suits are approximately sixty-six involving personal injury occurring in connection with administration of the company's DPT and oral polio vaccines; these vaccines involve very large damage claims, including claims for
punitive damages in many cases. In the opinion of management, the ultimate liability resulting from all pending suits
and claims (after taking into account insurance coverage) will
not have a material adverse effect upon the consolidated financial position of the company or its subsidiaries.
American Cyanamid Annual Report, 1984, page 39.
98. Who did best and worst among the 500, FORTUNE, Apr. 27, 1987, at 404.
99. Id. at 384. In this "return to investors" category, pharmaceuticals ranked number six out of twenty-five industries. The return ranged from a low of -9.50% in metals
to a high of 48.74 % in tobacco. The industry breakdowns are as follows: tobacco 48. 74%,
rubber products 38.5%, food 36.50%, textiles 35.96%, forest products 30.88%,
pharmaceuticals 27.90%, scientific and photo equipment 22.87%, chemicals 21.84%,
metal products 21.73%, apparel 21.51 %, furniture 17.83%, soaps, cosmetics 16.67%, beverages 16.37%, computers and office equipment 14.64%, publishing, printing 14.47%,
building materials 14.07%, transportation equipment 9.32%, industrial and farm equipment 7.33%, electronics 6.55%, motor vehicles and parts 5.16%, petroleum refining
4.00%, aerospace -.04%, mining -.51 %, toys, sporting goods -1.11 %, metals -9.50%. Id.
In the "return on stockholder's equity" category, the pharmaceutical industry emerged
as the leader with an median of 23.6% followed by the tobacco industry with a median of
22.1 %. The low in this category was the toy, sporting goods industry with a median of
.3%. Id. at 385.
100. Id. at 404. Also, Abbott Laboratories reported record sales and profits for the
second quarter of 1987. Net income for the period rose to $155.1 million, from $133.7
million in the year-earlier period. Chicago Tribune, July 10, 1987, § 3, at 2, col. 1.
101. I d. at at 386.
102. Note, Strict Liability in Tort: Its Applicability to Manufacturers of Prescription Drugs, 7 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 508 (1974).
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lesser standard of liability is unrealistic because most drug manufacturers distribute nationwide, including those states which
have held that prescription drugs are not automatically exempted from strict liability design defect analysis. l03 Consequently, in the development of new drugs, manufacturers must
not only consider liability under California law, but also the
tighter reins of liability in other states. 10",
3. The Kearl test would not cause a delay in marketing new
drugs that confer exceptional benefits

There are some drugs which should get to the consuming
public quickly. But that is why it is necessary to analyze each
new drug on a case-by-case basis. If there were exigent circumstances or the drug was to confer an exceptional benefit, the
Kearl test would not subject a drug manufacturer to a strict liability standard. l05
In contrast, speed is less important in cases where the drug
does not confer an exceptional benefit. For example, the public
can wait longer for prescription drugs which are primarily cosmetic, if additional testing might ensure greater safety.
4.

Insurance costs for high risk drugs

The Brown court cited several examples of drugs that had
to be taken off the market (or could not be put on the market)
because of the inability to obtain liability insurance at a reasonable cost.10 6 The court stated, "[w]e express no opinion whether
the products to which these examples relate were in fact beneficial to the public health."l07 It is absurd not to consider this factor since obtaining insurance is a way of allocating risk and if a
product is uninsurable, that implies a high risk. In a high risk
103. See supra note 56.
104. Id.
105. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 829-830, 218 Cal. Rptr.
453, 463-464 (1985).
106. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1064-1065, 751 P.2d 470, 479-480,
245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 421 (1988). The court gave examples of an influenza vaccine, a diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine, a new drug for treatment of vision problems, and an
anti-~auseant drug, Bendectin.
107. Id. at 1065 n.10, 751 P.2d at 480, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
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situation, the manufacturer should then consider how high a
benefit the drug is intended to confer. Even more absurd is that
the court gave Bendectin, an anti-nauseant drug for pregnant
women, as an example of a drug that had to be removed from
the market because the cost of insurance almost equalled the
entire income from the sale of the drug. lOB Bendectin has been
associated with limb deformities and other congenital defects in
children of mothers who took the drug. lo9 The example of
Bendectin, rather than supporting the court's proposition, instead illustrates one of the goals of adopting the Kearl test:
when the risk becomes so high that the drug is difficult to insure, it forces the manufacturer to consider whether an anti-nauseant drug such as Bendectin is conferring an especially important benefit. If not, the drug should be removed from the
market.
The Brown court gave an example of a situation in which a
manufacturer was unable to market a new drug to treat vision
problems because it could not obtain adequate insurance. llo This
illustration is misleading, however, because the drug, Oculinum,
is an experimental one and has not been licensed by the FDA.1l1
The FDA does not allow patients to be charged for experimental
drugs whose value has not been firmly proven. 112 Naturally, the
situation is greatly altered when a drug cannot be charged for
because the principle of risk distribution is not applicable. That
is, the cost of insurance cannot be spread to the consuming public. This is obviously different from the profit-making drug manufacturer who may spread the cost of insurance to consumers of
the drug.
108. Id. at 1064, 751 P.2d at 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421.

109. Selker, An Escape from Strict Liability: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Responsibility for Drug-related Injuries under Comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 23 DUQ. LAW REV. 199, n.4 (1984).
110. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1065, 751 P.2d 470, 480, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 412, 421 (1988).
111. The drug is made from botulinum, the same toxin that poisons improperly
canned food. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1986, at C1, col. 3.
112. Dr. Alan B. Scott, a proponent of Oculinum, sought permission to charge for
the drug so he could pay for his insurance. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1986, at C1, col. 3.
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5. The price of prescription drugs will still be affordable to
the consuming public

The Brown court gave two examples of dramatic price increases, one case involving a vaccine and the other, a prescription drug. 113
Although drug price inflation exceeds the overall inflation
rate,114 the example of Bendectin lltl cited by the court is extreme
and atypical of the general price increases of prescription drugs.
The average prescription cost increased 4.6% from 1985 to 1986
and the average actual cost increased from $9.73 to $10.18. 116
One survey estimated that, for persons using prescription drugs,
the average annual expenditure for those under sixty-five was
$46 per person and for those over sixty-five, $93 per person. ll7
113. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1064-1065, 751 P.2d at 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
114. STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No.1 at H 18. The
overall consumer price index rose 1.9% in 1986. Medical care rose 7.5%. Id. at H 15.
During the same year, the average wholesale price for prescription drugs rose by 8.7%.
Budiansky, The cost of new drugs raises the roof, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Apr. 6,
1987, at 47.
115. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1064, 751 P.2d 470, 479, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 412, 421 (1988). The price of Bendectin rose 300% before it was removed from the
market. Id. The actual cost went from 30 cents per tablet to $1.00 per tablet. Lawsuits
Kill Off a Pregnancy Drug, CHEMICAL WEEK, June 22, 1983, at 14. Bendectin, as a pregnancy prescription drug, is different than many prescription drugs. First, it is reasonable
to expect that any drug taken by a pregnant woman may affect the fetus and insurance
companies are legitimately fearful about insuring such drugs. Second, even though $1.00
per tablet is expensive, the drug was to be taken only on a temporary basis to prevent
nausea.
116. STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No.1 at H20. As of
November 1986, selected prescription drug groups showed the following year-to· year increases: analgesics, 13.0%; antiarthritics, 11.2%; systemic anti·infectives, 6.4%; antispasmodic/anti secretory, 12.1 %; bronchial therapy, 13.6%; cancer therapy, 6.9%; cardiovascular, 11.5%; central nervous system stimulants, 25.8%; contraceptives, 13.3%, cough
and cold preparations, 8.7%; and dermatological preparations, 2.8%. Id. at H 19.
The following reflect price increases of prescription drugs as compared to all other
consumer goods between 1981 and 1986 (ratio represented by prescription drugs:all other
products): 1981 11.7%:10.4%, 1982 11.0%:6.1%, 1983 10.5%:3.2%, 1984 9.5%: 4.3%,
1985 9.1 %:3.6%, 1986 8.7%:1.9%. Budiansky, The Cost of New Drugs Raises the Roof,
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Apr. 6, 1987, at 47.
117. PMA Statistical Factbook, 1986 at 2-9 to 2-10. The statistics for this study
were gathered in 1977. Id. A later study was done in 1980 but statistics were reported on
a per capita basis rather than the "average charge per user" that the 1977 study reflected. Per capita charges are averaged over all persons in the population, whether they
used prescription drugs or not, and thus are lower than average charges per user. That
study showed that the per capita cost for prescription drugs was $35 in 1980. Costs of
Illness United States, 1980, National Medical Care Utilization and Expenditure Survey,
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The Brown court also used the cost and the predicted
shortage of the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DPT) vaccine 1l8 to
illustrate its point.1l9 The vaccine rose in cost from 11 cents in
1982 to $11.40 in 1986. 120 This is a drastic increase, but it is not
representative of typical price increases in prescription drugs.
The Brown court cannot reasonably draw inferences about the
cost of prescription drugs based on vaccine statistics because
they are not analogous situations. This is evidenced by legislative intervention to deal specifically with problems of liability
and compensation for vaccine injuries. 121 In contrast, Congress
has not found it necessary to intervene in the area of prescription drugs.
Rising costs are not limited to the pharmaceutical industry.122 Even outside the pharmaceutical industry, there has been
a surge of product related lawsuits.123 "Premiums paid by companies for protection against product-related litigation have
been soaring-and in the last year alone, increases of 300% or
more have not been uncommon. "124 Difficulties faced by pharmaceutical companies in obtaining insurance at a reasonable
cost is not unique to that industry, but is a problem faced by
page 7.
Rising costs of prescription drugs may present a genuine hardship to the elderly.
People over 65 consume about 30% of all prescription drugs. The Big Lie About Generic
Drugs, CONSUMER REPORTS, Aug. 1987, at 480. It is important to ensure the availability
of prescription drugs to these people. A discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of
this article except to note some available alternatives. Many prescription drugs are available in generic form. [d. at 481-482. Brand names cost 70% more than generics. [d. at
481.
118. The pertussis component of DPT is made from the whole Bordetella pertussis
bacterium. The bacterium contain two toxins which are suspected of causing adverse
effects on the central nervous system. White v. Wyeth, 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 391, 533
N.E.2d 748, 749 (1988).
119. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1064-1065, 751 P.2d 470, 479-480,
245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 421 (1988).
120. [d.
121. In 1986 Congress passed and the President signed into law the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-660, Title III, Section 2101-2128, 100 Stat.
3755-84, 42 U.S.C. Section aa-l et seq, amended by the Vaccine Compensation Amendments of 1987, P.L. 100-203, 133 Congo Rec. H 12103, at 12166 (Dec. 21, 1987). In the
Act, Congress created a "no-fault'" compensation system to assure children injured by
vaccines could secure recovery.
122. The Sue Syndrome, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 1977, at 61-62.
123. [d. The cause and cure for this trend are beyond the scope of this article. For
detailed analysis, see 5 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH), 623-638 app. G.
124. The Sue Syndrome, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 1977, at 61-62.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss3/2

24

Brodie: Products Liability

459

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

1990]

other industries as well. 125 As long as pharmaceutical products
are still available and affordable, it is unreasonable to draw an
artificial line at the boundaries of prescription drugs.
Finally, the threat that drug manufacturers may face a
stricter standard will encourage greater honesty and a faster response in removing a drug from the market if it is discovered
that the drug is potentially defective~ Drug manufacturers must
recoup their investments quickly because of the threat that a
competitor may produce a superior drug. 126 Consequently, once
a drug has been released, there is incentive for manufacturers to
suppress adverse information and delay FDA regulatory action.127 However, in a strict liability design defect analysis, the
focus is on the product, not the manufacturer's standard of care.
A manufacturer's incentive to continue marketing a potentially
defective drug is, therefore, diminished because the issue will be
whether the product was defective, not whether the manufacturer was negligent.
E. A

LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: CODIFICATION OF A

Kearl

TYPE

ANALYSIS

Oliver Wendell Holmes once stated, "it must be
remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the
125. [d.
126. Comment, Drug Product Liability and Health Care Delivery Systems, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 989, 1017 (1988). Moving a drug from the initial discovery stage through FDA
approval can take from seven to ten years and cost over $100 million. STANDARD & POORS
INDUSTRY SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No.1 at H 19.
127. [d. at 1017, n.113. There are several examples of drug manufacturers' "slow
reflex time" in removing drugs from the market. In 1969, Upjohn challenged an FDA
order removing the combination antibiotic Pan alba from the market. Upjohn earned $1.5
million per month from Panalba sales until the court affirmed FDA's order several
months later. Id. at 1017, n.113 (citing S. Greenberg, THE QUALITY OF MERCY 269, at 27374 (1971». "Despite conclusive evidence of the drug's danger and the fact that it was
superior to other antibiotics in only a handful of emergencies, Parke-Davis downplayec!
the drug's toxicity so effectively that ten years after the discovery of its adverse effects,
Chlormycetin was being prescribed wrongly in about 90% of cases ... " [d. at 1018, n.118
(citing M. Silverman and P. Lee, PILLS, PROFITS, AND POLITICS at 59-61, 283-88 (1974».
In marketing MER/29, "Richardson-Merrell falsified results of animal tests, withheld
negative outside reports, prepared 'scientific papers' signed by 'independent' investigators, and bribed physicians not to criticize the drug." [d. at 1019, n.127 (citing M.
Silverman and P. Lee, PILLS, PROFITS, AND POLITICS at 89-94).
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courts. "128 The Brown decision may be an appropriate occasion
for the California legislature to intervene and exercise its
"guardian" role. A possible solution to remedy the effect of
Brown is that the legislature codify a Kearl type analysis. This
will enable courts to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a
prescription drug is unavoidably unsafe and entitled to exemption from strict liability design defect analysis. The following is
a suggested model statute: 129
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) below, a
manufacturer of an FDA-approved prescription
drug that is sold, delivered, administered or dispensed in California shall be held strictly liable
for all damages proximately or legally caused by a
design defect in the drug.
(2) A manufacturer of an FDA-approved prescription drug that is sold, delivered, administered or
dispensed in California shall not be held liable for
any damages proximately or legally caused by a
design defect in the drug if the trial judge determines that the drug is unavoidably unsafe. A prescription drug is unavoidably unsafe if the trial
judge determines that each of the criteria set
forth in (A), (B) and (C) below are conjunctively
met.
(A) The drug was intended to confer an exceptionally important health benefit on society that made its availability highly
desirable.
(B) The risk posed by the product was both
substantial and unavoidable.
(i) In deciding whether the risk posed
was substantial as stated in section
(2)(B), a court should consider
whether, at the time of distribution,
the risk posed permanent or long-term
disability (e.g. loss of body functions,
organs, or death) as opposed to temporary inconvenience (e.g. skin rash).
(ii) In deciding whether the risk posed
128. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270,48 L.Ed. 971, 973, 24 S.Ct.
638 (1904).
129. The language of this model statute is taken primarily from the test set forth in
Kear! v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 829-830, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463-464
(1985).
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was unavoidable as stated in section
(2)(B) a court should consider:
(a) If the product design minimized risks inherent in the product, and
(b) The availability of any alternative product that would have as
effectively accomplished the full
intended purpose of the product.
(C) The interest in availability of the prescription drug outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced accountability through
strict liability design defect review.
(3) The trial court shall rule as a matter of law 130
as to whether a prescription drug shall be considered unavoidably unsafe according to the criteria
as set forth in section (2) above.
(4) Each of the criteria (A), (B) and (C) above are
to be determined as of the time the drug was
distributed.
(5) Nothing in this statute effects the liability of a
manufacturer on issues pertaining to failure to
warn.

V.

CONCLUSION

For over thirty years the California Supreme Court has pioneered the way of product liability law in seeking ways to provide a remedy to protect those injured by defective products.
This consumer protection strand has guided the court to cut
through the citadel of privity,l3l limitations of warranty,132 the
130. Some courts have emphasized the factual determinations necessary and believe
it is proper for the jury to decide whether a product is unavoidably unsafe. Toner v.
Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 339, n.9, 732 P.2d 297, 308-309 (1987). Others consider it a decision for the court to decide as a matter of law. [d.
131. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Plaintiff
was injured as a result of a defect in one of the wheels of an automobile. The issue of the
case was whether the defendant manufacturer owed a duty of care to anyone but the
immediate purchaser, the retailer. The court held that the manufacturer was liable to
the plaintiff.
132. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Plaintiff was injured when the steering gear of the automobile she was driving malfunctioned.
[d. at 369, 161 A.2d at 75. The court held that the manufacturer's attempt to disclaim an
implied warranty of merchantability was so harmful to the public good that it would be
considered invalid. [d. at 408, 161 A.2d at 97.
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burden of proof,133 and causation. 134 The court's decision in
Brown reflects a retreat from the its consumer protection orientation and a diversion from the sentiments expressed in Sindell
just eight years ago. At that time, the court stated that the considerations underlying strict liability are "particularly significant
where medication is involved, for the consumer is virtually helpless to protect himself from serious, sometimes permanent,
sometimes fatal, injuries caused by deleterious drugs."1311
The public policies of availability and affordability of prescription drugs are important, but they should not override the
policies underlying strict liability. A Kearl type analysis fairly
balances a drug manufacturer's liability with consumer protection by providing drug manufacturers an opportunity to escape a
strict liability standard if a drug qualifies as "unavoidably unsafe." Thus, this balance facilitates the aim that the obligation
of the manufacturer will continue to be based upon "the demands of social justice. m3e
Terrie Bialostok Brodie *

133. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431·432, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978).
134. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1980). Plaintiff could not identify which drug manufacturer produced the DES ingested
by her mother. The court adopted the market share theory to deal with the impossibility
plaintiff would otherwise have in establishing causation.
135. [d. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
136. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 384, 161 A.2d 69 (citing
Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 627, 135 P. 633, 635 (1913)).
* Golden Gate University, Class of 1990.
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